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Spatial Mobility and Returns to Education: 
 Some Evidence from a Sample of French Youth
*
 
The purpose of this article is to reevaluate the returns to geographic mobility and to the level 
of education, taking into account the interaction between these two variables. We have at our 
disposal an original French database that permits precise calculation of the distance between 
the place of education and the location of first employment. We thus capture mobility without 
a priori regarding the geographical areas selected, and we use kilometric thresholds to 
estimate the returns to spatial mobility. Our results suggest decreasing returns to spatial 
mobility as the distance covered rises and increasing returns to mobility with higher levels of 
education. In addition, for all levels of education, including the lowest, returns to geographic 
mobility prove to be positive, for one threshold at least and several distances. 
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1  Introduction 
In this paper, we use an original French data set, the “Generation Survey 98” (Enquête 
génération 98), to estimate the returns to education and to geographic mobility for a sample of 
young men who left the French educational system in 1998.  This mobility concerns the 
acquisition of a first employment.  The mobility in question is between the town in which the 
youths complete their education and the town in which they obtain their first employment.  
We look at what factors influence their education level and their spatial mobility and the 
returns to these decisions. 
In the literature, the returns to spatial mobility are often estimated by considering “education” 
as an exogenous variable even though its endogeneity has been firmly established - see Card 
(2001) for instance.  The goal of this article is to reevaluate the returns to spatial mobility and 
the returns to education when these variables are assumed endogenous.  We use a flexible 
specification that allows the returns to spatial mobility to depend on the level of education. 
For this purpose, we have at our disposition a database that allows us to collect precise 
information, both on the determinants of the level of education and on migration.  However, 
the originality of the data resides especially in calculating the distances covered for each 
decision of mobility between towns.  We can thus characterize mobility without a priori 
concerning the geographic areas selected by estimating the returns to spatial mobility for 
different kilometric thresholds.  
This method contrasts with studies such as Raphael and Riker (1999) on US data, using a 
dummy variable for spatial mobility, and Détang-Dessendre, Drapier and Jayet (2004) on 









































7we focus on the first job experience of individuals who all leave the educational system in 
1998, we avoid the traditional cohort effect problems and pitfalls related to work experience.
1
The results of the paper suggest returns to spatial mobility that increase with the level of 
education and that depend on the distance covered. It seems that the positive effect of spatial 
mobility on earnings decreases with distance.  
Section 2 exposes the theoretical background.  In Section 3, we present the data and the 
empirical model.  In Sections 4, we summarize the empirical findings and discuss some of 
their implications.  Section 5 concludes the text. 
2  Economic background: mobility and wages 
The introduction of the spatial dimension into the theory of employment prospection 
(Lippman and McCall, 1976), consists of taking into account the extent of the geographic area 
prospected (Wolpin, 1987).  The individual no longer faces a unique labor market, but a 
multitude of local labor markets.  Broadening the prospection area increases the supply of 
jobs offered, and thus the probability that one among them will be selected (Pickles and 
Rogerson, 1983).  The choice of changing zones of employment is linked to control over 
information, generally correlated with the level of education, which is itself determinant of the 
cost of migration.  For the theory of human capital in particular, it is the arbitrage between 
these costs and the wage advantage associated with migration that leads to migration or not.  
Prospection takes place if the anticipated wage, less the cost of migration, is superior to the 
anticipated wage in the initial location (Todaro, 1969). 
Two types of mobility costs, direct costs of mobility (transportation, lodging, child care)
2 and 
opportunity costs of mobility (earnings forgone while travelling, searching for job, “psychic 
                                                           
1 See Card and Lemieux (2001) for a clear account of cohort effects.  See Knight and Sabot (1981) and Abraham and Medof 
(1981) for problems related to job experience in earnings functions. 
2 The cost of housing is important in the case under study here because we are considering youth who obtain their first job 










































3 affect mobility choice.  Parts of these costs will be function of the distance 
of migration (Sjaastad, 1962).  In addition, studies that analyze the impact of migration on 
wages in the human capital framework stem from the hypothesis that an individual who 
migrates may be intrinsically more motivated to invest in human capital (not only through 
migration) than others.  Therefore, whatever his migration decision, this individual will 
receive better wages (Greenwood, 1997).  
However, the migration does not have necessarily a positive effect on the wages. In fact, 
individuals could choose to migrate to compensate for their insufficiency in the human capital 
form.  In this case, it is not the “best” who migrate, but the youth of “average value”.  The 
most accomplished among them obtain the best jobs in their own employment area, obliging 
other youths to migrate to capture more numerous opportunities in other employment areas  
(Détang-Dessendre, Drapier and Jayet, 2004). Another reason is that migration responds to 
non-compensating wage differentials (Hunt, 1993).  Consequently, if individuals have 
preferences for certain amenities (for example, climate amenities, warmth versus cold), then 
equilibrium wages will be lower in regions characterized by more of the amenity.  The lower 
regional wages do not imply lower utility because the lower wages are compensating for the 
attractive amenity (Hunt and Mueller, 2004). 
For example, Falaris (1988), on a sample of young workers two years after exit of the 
education system, find negative returns for two regions and non significant for two others, 
whereas many other studies report non significant returns. Détang-Dessendre, Drapier and 
Jayet (2004), using a sample of youth departing from the French educational system, find 
positive returns only for those with the highest degrees and non-significant returns for the 
others. On US data (current population survey, displaced workers files 1986 – 1988 – 1990), 
                                                           
3 Since people are often genuinely reluctant to leave familiar surroundings, family and friends, migration involves a psychic 









































7Gabriel and Schmitz (1995) and Raphaël and Riker (1999) (young workers men between 1985 
and 1991- SMSA) show positive returns to migration.    
A possible explanation of the differences in results is the geographical area retained. Indeed, 
what is a “migration”? Plainly, the question does not have a clear empirical answer.  In this 
domain, the areas of mobility selected are either the result of administrative divisions, whose 
logical structure is not necessarily justified from an economic standpoint, or stem from efforts 
to define homogenous areas according to diverse criteria (economic homogeneity, 
infrastructure endowment).  Examples of the first case would be “regions” and “departments”.  
An example of the second, for France, would be “Employment zones”.
4  
Migration is then defined as mobility from one of theses geographic areas to another of the 
same type.  Beyond problems of homogeneity within each spatial division, such conventions 
pose two types of well-known problems: migrations close to the border and amplitude of the 
migrations (Hunt and Mueller, 2004).  To begin with, individuals situated close to the border 
of a geographic area are counted as migrants even if they simply cross the borderline, perhaps 
representing just a short trip from home to work for some of them.  Besides, geographic areas 
with the same nomenclature do not always have the same size and are evidently not all 
equidistant.  Hence, mobility between two small areas can be counted as a migration while 
mobility within a single large geographic area will not, even though the distance covered in 
the second case may well be much greater than in the first.   
To solve this problem, at least partly, we make no hypothesis about the homogeneity of 
geographic areas and compensate for the inconveniences linked to the amplitude of mobility 
by using distances covered. We characterize mobility without a priori concerning the 
geographic areas selected by estimating the returns to spatial mobility for different kilometric 
thresholds. 
                                                           
4It is similar to the Travel-To-Work Area in the United-Kingdom or to the Local Labour System for Italy.  Each zone is 
defined so that the majority of the resident population has a job within its borders and that the firms located there hire the 










































3  Data and empirical model 
3.1  Sample selection 
We have exploited data in the Céreq’s “Generation 98” survey in which 55,000 youths who 
left the French educational system with an initial education in 1998 are observed over a three-
year period.  They are representative of the whole generation of those leaving (700,000).  The 
sample retained in this study contains only young men who obtained a first full-time job, 
which is 24,587 youths.  The restriction of the scope of investigation to men with a full-time 
job is due to the availability of monthly salary data alone, without variables sufficiently 
detailed to take into account part-time work - while numerous women work part time.   
The fact that we have at our disposal a single generation of youth leaving the educational 
system allows us to avoid several problems encountered in the estimation of the gains 
functions.  The problems linked to the inverse correlation between the duration of schooling 
and experience in the labor market do not exist here: all individuals in the sample enter the 
labor market at the same moment (1998).
5 Furthermore, cohort effects are limited, a single 
generation of labor-market entrants being present,
6 and these cohort effects are not neutral 
with respect to the returns to education (Harmon and Walker, 1995, Card and Lemieux, 2001).  
Lastly, our choice of restricting analysis to starting salaries when first hired is linked to our 
intention of not making the analysis more complex than need be. If we were to take into 
account the subsequent job history, the variables that characterize it would probably also be 
endogenous, which would require a complex, dynamic model. 
 
 
                                                           
5 Even if they do not find a work immediately. 
6 Youth who left the educational system in 1998 were evidently not all born in the same year.  However, 
dispersion in terms of age rarely exceeds 5 years, and birth cohorts usually concern a minimum of 5 









































73.2  Mobility and education levels variables  
The distances covered between the towns are calculated “as the crow flies” between the 
centers of the towns of departure and the towns of arrival.  In a pair (x,y) representing the 
geographic coordinates of a set of points, the distance between point A (departure) and B 
(arrival) is given by the equation  . )² ( )² ( ) , ( A B A B y y x x B A d − + − =  Departure is the place 
of completion of education (1998) and arrival the place of the first job.  
Since mobility near the border and short trips exist, we test several thresholds to account for 
“relevant” spatial migration: 0 (a change between towns = a mobility), 20 kilometers,
7 50 
kilometers and 100 kilometers. For each threshold, mobility has a meaning only beyond that 
threshold.  For example, if the threshold is 20 kilometers, a youth who travels 55 km carries 
out a mobility of 35 km.  The decision to migrate in this case is based on a change of towns 20 
km apart.  For a 50 km threshold, the distance is 5 km; and for a threshold of 100 km, the 
youth is considered non-mobile. Here we come back to the differences that can exist between 
partition by region versus division by Employment zones for example.
The variable that characterizes the level of education is the highest level attained and not the 
number of years of study. Indeed, the latter reflects rather poorly the amount of accumulated 
human capital as it often corresponds to a period of study superior to the length time 
necessary to obtain the degree. For instance, for 15 years of study (counted beyond the age of 
6), which in theory corresponds to the French Baccalauréat + 2 years, only 50% of youth 
have reached this level, while 26% have the level of the Baccalauréat, (“Bac” hereafter).  The 
level of the remaining students is still lower.  Moreover, less than 30% of youth reach the 
level of the Bac after 13 years of study.  The remaining students have a lower level, even no 
qualification at all, after retaking numerous academic years.   
                                                           









































7The variable we construct takes on a limited number of values, corresponding to different 
levels of schooling: without qualification, the first level of professional training,
8 the Bac, 
Bac+1, Bac+2, Bac+3, Bac+4, Bac+5, >Bac+5.  
Table (1) exhibits some descriptive statistics of the sample.  One individual out of four has 
completed at least 14 years of study (P25).  10% of them earn at least 1829 euros per month 
(P90).  About 72.4% work in a town different from the one in which they finished their 
studies.  For 50% of them, the distance between the two towns remains limited - less than 20 
kilometers (P50).   
TABLE (1) HERE 
3.3  The empirical model 
The complete model is:  
  log(wage) = b0 + b1y1 + b2y2 + b12(y1y2) + b22(y2)
2 + b3y3 + X1b + u          (1) 
            y1 =   +  e
1 δ W e 1           ( 2 )  
y2 = Wδ2 + e2  if  y2 > 0  and  P(y2 = 0 | W) = 1 − Φ (Wβ2)  otherwise     (3) 
      (y1y2) = Wδ12 + e12  if  y1y2 > 0  and  P(y1y2 = 0 | W) = 1 − Φ (Wβ12)  otherwise        (4) 
        (y2)
2 
 = Wδ22 + e22  if  y2
2 > 0 and P(y2
2 = 0 | W) = 1 − Φ (Wβ22)  otherwise    (5) 
y3 = 1I (Wδ3 + e3  >   0 )              ( 6 )  
y4 = 1I (Wδ4 + e4  >   0 ) .            ( 7 )  
The first equation of interest is the structural equation where y1 is the education level and y2 
the distance covered between the student’s place of residence at the end of his studies and the 
site of his first employment.  The distance in question is the distance beyond the threshold of 
mobility (which is equal to 0, 20, 50 or 100 km, depending on the estimation).  We call this 
measure “spatial mobility” in what follows.  Additionally, y3 is a dummy variable for living in 
the Paris region. All else being equal, Paris/province partition clearly determines the most 
                                                           









































7significant differences of salary in France. Finally, X1 is a vector that includes socioeconomic 
variables. 
This specification allows flexible responses of wage to spatial mobility. In addition, the 
interaction term (y1y2) allows returns from migration to differ according to the level of 
education. Ideally, we should also include a quadratic term in years of schooling to account 
for a possible non-monotonic relationship between education and wages.  However, education 
and its square are nearly collinear in our data.  
As discussed in the literature, earnings equations suffer from heterogeneity and selection bias. 
Heterogeneity is usually associated with individual ability and motivation that are likely 
correlated with education and spatial migration. Endogeneity of living in the Paris region is 
another potential problem. Finally, we observe the wage rate only for those who choose to 
work which may induce a selectivity bias. Therefore, we have chosen to instrument the 
education level (equation (2)), the spatial migration (equation (3)), its interaction with 
education level (equation (4)), its square (equation (5)) and the Paris region (equation (6)). 
Equation (7) is the selection equation on full-time jobs. We allow arbitrary correlation among 
u, e1, e2, e12, e22, e3 and e4. The matrix W includes the exogenous regressors X1 as well as the 
matrix X2 of excluded instruments. It is described below. 
We estimate years of schooling with a Poisson regression model (Poisson QMLE) since they 
only take on non-negative integer values.
9 Spatial mobility, its square and its interaction with 
education are estimated with a two-part model. It is partly continuous with many observations 
at 0.  Unlike the standard Tobit model, this specification allows the initial decision of y2 > 0 
versus y2 = 0 to be separate from the decision of how much y2 given that y2 > 0.  Finally, we 
use binary response models for the Paris region and the selection equation. 
                                                           
9 We also estimate the level of education with a negative binomial model (QMLE). The results are similar. See 









































7To estimate our model, we use a two-step procedure.  First, the six reduced forms are 
estimated separately; then the wage equation is estimated using OLS on 
 
                       log(wage) = b0 + b1y1 + b2y2 + b12(y1y2) + b22(y2)
2 + b3y3 + X1b +                (8) 
  γ1v ˆ 1 + γ2v ˆ 2 + γ12v ˆ 12 + γ22v ˆ 22 + γ3v ˆ 3 + γ4v ˆ 4 + ε, 
where  ε is a random term that represents the unobserved heterogeneity.  The   are the 
residuals from reduced forms to control for the potential endogeneity of years of schooling 
(
v ˆ
v ˆ 1), distance to work (v ˆ 2, a generalized residual from a two-part model), the interaction 
between distance to work and education (v ˆ 12, another generalized residual from a two-part 
model), the square of distance to work (v ˆ 22, a last generalized residual from a two-part 
model), the Paris region (v ˆ 3, an inverse Mill’s ratio) and selection (v ˆ 4, another inverse Mill’s 
ratio).  It also provides a direct test of exogeneity by means of the t−statistics of the estimates 
of γ; see Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) for an application of this control function 
approach.  The asymptotic covariance matrix of the second step estimator is computed using 
the results of Newey (1984) and Newey and McFadden (1994) to take into account that we are 
conditioning on generated regressors (that is, v ˆ 1, v ˆ 2, v ˆ 12, v ˆ 22, v ˆ 3 and v ˆ 4).  It is robust to 
heteroskedasticity of unknown form.   
At this stage, the selection of the instruments that appear in the auxiliary regressions (2) to (7) 
requires some discussion. In the literature, differences of education levels are often 
attributable to borrowing constraints. Two types of schooling costs affect the borrowing 
constraints: opportunity costs of schooling (the value of earnings forgone while in school) and 
direct costs of schooling (monetary cost of tuition, books, transportation, and board and room 
if necessary).
 10  
                                                           
10 See Card (1999, 2001) for a survey on effects of family background. Card (1995), then Cameron and Taber 
(2004) capture the borrowing constraints also by a proxy for the proximity of the learning establishment. We do 









































7Carneiro and Heckman (2002) distinguish between two types of borrowing constraints, one in 
the short term and one in the long term.  The first concerns financing capacity at a given 
moment (that is, at the date of the survey) and plays a limited role. The second, the long-term 
constraint that weighs on the entire duration of schooling (and perhaps at the entry on the 
labour market), reflects notably family background. In this perspective, the differences in 
education levels for youth with identical, ex-ante aptitudes are primarily attributed to 
differences in family background and family income.Thus for many studies, family 
background and family income are likely to influence the level of education. 
Mobility is also not independent of family background and income which influences the costs 
of migration (Détang-Dessendre, Drapier and Jayet, 2004). In addition, migration behaviour 
remains highly associated with territorial characteristics. For example, information circulates 
more easily and in greater quantity in urban markets than in rural markets, which reduces the 
cost of information research. Spatial mobility therefore remains particularly constrained by 
the characteristics of the territory. Another reason for taking into account the characteristics of 
territory is the existence of amenities that are likely to compensate for unfavourable salary 
differences by increasing the opportunity cost of migration (Gabriel and Schmitz, 1995).  
Along these lines, with respect to family background and income variables, we include as 
instruments a set of variables that represent the youths’ social origin by indicators of their 
parents’ professions and their nationalities. More innovative is that we account for the 
parents’ occupational status at the time when the youth leaves the education system in 1998 
(father or mother unemployed, salaried, retired, etc.). With respect to territorial characteristics, 
we include as instruments a set of variables that characterize the place of completion of 
education: area of studies (for taking into account amenities, notably), surface and density of 
population of the Employment Zone of studies, lives in a rural area at the end of schooling. 
Our intuition is that all these variables have an impact on the various endogenous variables 









































7However, some of these instruments are probably important determinants of wages. As a 
matter of fact, some family background factors (father’s profession: farmer, technician, 
unknown and mother’s profession: farmer, clerk, inactive) appear to be significant 
determinants of wages in our estimation. Some regional variables (population density of the 
Employment Zone of studies, whether he lives in a rural area at the end of schooling) are also 
statistically significant in the wage equation. Therefore, we decide to control for these 
variables in the wage equation.  
If we allow the regions of studies and the father’s nationality to appear in the wage equation, 
they are statistically significant but the estimates of the parameters related to spatial migration 
become imprecise. We thus maintain these exclusion restrictions. It is made primarily for 
want of decent instruments.  
All in all, there are 15 included instruments (a constant, three dummies for the father’s 
profession, three dummies for the mother’s profession, two regional variables and six 
generalised residuals) and 24 excluded instruments from the wage equation (region to be 
educated (7 dummies), surface of the Employment Zone of studies, parents’ origin (4 
dummies), parents’ occupational status(5 dummies), Father's profession (3 dummies), 
Mother’s profession (4 dummies)). Let us now turn to the results.  
4  Results 
Before we present any further results we report in Table (2) statistics that test the validity of 
the excluded instruments in all the auxiliary regressions and for all thresholds. Under the null 
hypothesis, none of them is significant. The corresponding p-values are close to zero, 
indicating that it is clearly rejected.  These results provide evidence that the instruments are 
significant for all the endogenous variables. The estimates of the auxiliary regressions are 
shown in Appendix A. To save space, for equations (4) and (5), we only report the results at 









































7TABLE (2) HERE 
4.1  Auxiliary regressions: education level and mobility 
Table A1 in Appendix A displays the results of the estimation of the level of schooling with 
the Poisson model. Public authorities have attempted to improve the distribution of the offer 
of education over the French territory.
11 Obviously, the regional disparities remain.  Indicators 
of schooling location are in fact often significant. Paradoxically, it seems that discrepancies 
sometimes are favorable in comparison to the reference, the Paris region.  Nevertheless, this is 
a ceteris paribus analysis. Among the explanatory variables figure also the population density 
and the rural nature of the school setting, which influence respectively positively and 
negatively the level of schooling. On the contrary, the Parisian region’s population density is 
at least 5 times greater than that of other regions and manifestly is not situated in a rural zone.  
Having a foreign father or mother lowers the level of studies attained. The great majority of 
foreigners are immigrants with low qualifications, and that can be reflected in children’s 
difficulties to adapt to the educational system (language and initial level problems, parents’ 
low education level) and in the borrowing constraints as well. 
If either the father or the mother is unemployed at the time the child leaves the educational 
system, the latter will tend to do shorter studies.  It is clear that the short-term borrowing 
constraints weigh heavily here since the child cannot compensate for his parents’ reduced 
income by a loan.  Such a situation is not surprising in France where parents must very often 
guarantee any loan to children, whatever their scholastic performance may be.  This result 
contrasts with the findings of Shea (2000) for the United States, which suggest that changes in 
                                                           
11 First, for professional schooling, ever since the legislation on decentralization during the 1980s, regional 
administrations have much greater power and autonomy, at least in the choice of where to set up new 
establishments.  At the university level, the “University 2000” program put into place during the 1990s, had as its 
objective to increase the supply of university education while distributing it over wider territory.  As a result, the 
cohort of youths that entered the labor market in 1998 is one of the most numerous, holding the most university 
degrees of the past two decades.  The rate of youth leaving the university possessing a degree rose by five 










































7parents’ income due to bad luck (job loss notably) have a negligible impact on children’s 
human capital for most families.   
If one considers, as do Cameron and Taber (2004), that the significance of parents’ 
qualification level indicates an influence of the long term borrowing constraints, then these 
latter are strong in France. The variables are all significant. The parents’ professions have the 
effects observed in numerous studies: the more qualified the father or the mother, the higher 
the children’s educational attainment.   
We present the results of the two-part model estimations of equation (3) in Appendix A 
(Tables A2 and A3) for the different thresholds. When we take into account short-distance 
migrations (threshold=0), the probability of migration increases for those studying in the Paris 
region. This result simply reflects the importance of commuting from home to work in the 
Paris region.  A youth who studies in the south of Paris and who finds a first job in the north 
of Paris is considered mobile for the 0 threshold. Conversely, the probability of migration is 
lower for those studying in the Paris region for threshold 20 and above.  
The effect of the region of education on the distance covered also differs considerably, 
depending on the threshold selected.  However, whatever the threshold chosen, it is when the 
student originates from the Mediterranean region that the distance covered is the greatest, all 
else being equal.   Many of them find employment in the Paris region, and in general, the 
coefficients attached to the region of education in the distance equation reflect the remoteness 
from the Paris region, which is the most important labor market in France. 
The fact of residing in a rural area while studying leads to more migration than urban 
residence, but that geographic situation leads to migrations of lesser amplitude. Inversely, the 
greater the population density of the Employment zone, the less probable is the migration.  
The probability of finding employment in a high-density Employment zone is in fact greater. 
The effects of variables characterizing the parents’ professions while studying are similar to 









































7respective coefficients are not often significant for the probability of migrating or for the 
distance covered. Next we discuss the wage equation results. 
4.2  Wage equation  
The results for the estimation of the wage equation at the different thresholds of mobility are 
presented in Table (3).  
TABLE (3) HERE 
The coefficient of the residual of the level of studies (v ˆ 1) is significantly different from 0. The 
exogeneity of the level of studies is therefore rejected. The coefficient of the residual (v ˆ 3) is 
also statistically different from 0, which indicates that living in the Paris region in 
endogenous. We see that living in the Paris region has a positive effect on wages. It mainly 
reflects the higher standard of living in the Paris area.  
Also, there is evidence of selection bias. On the other hand, the residuals corresponding to the 
distance variables do not have an impact at conventional levels.  This comes from the strong 
correlation between these residuals, leading to large estimated standard errors.  However, a 
joint test leads us to reject the null hypothesis H0: γ 2= γ 12= γ 22=0 at conventional levels, 
whatever the estimation. This result provides evidence that the distance covered is 
endogenous to the earnings function.  
We observe that the level of studies, which does not take into account the number of non-
validated years of study, has high returns. However, we do not have at our disposal variables 
characterizing intrinsic individual aptitudes. Several studies have shown that taking into 
account such variables limits the augmentation of returns to schooling when the education 
level is instrumented (Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999, Heckman and Carneiro, 2002). It is 
therefore probable that the returns to schooling are overestimated here. Note too that the 










































7As for the effect of migration on the salary, we see that the coefficients are positive for the 
interaction term (y1y2) between the level of studies and the distance covered on the one hand, 
and negative for both the distance term ( ) and the quadratic term ( )  on the other hand. 
Consequently, the returns to spatial mobility increase with the level of studies but diminish 




TABLE (4) HERE 
Table (4) presents marginal returns to spatial migration.  We calculate the marginal returns for 
each of four levels of education: the lowest (without qualification), then the Bac, Bac+2, and 
Bac+5, and four distances: 20, 100, 200 and 400 kilometers. For example, at the 20 km 
threshold, for a distance covered of 100 km and for a youth with an education level of Bac+5, 
the marginal returns to spatial mobility are 0.043%. At the distance thresholds of 0 and 20 km, 
the returns are not statistically different from 0 for individuals without qualification, except 
for long distances for which the returns are negative. Still for individuals without 
qualification, returns are positive for short distances at the 50 and 100 km thresholds. For 
higher levels of schooling, spatial returns to migration are positive except for long distances 
for which the returns are non significant.  
While the marginal returns are weak, it is important to keep in mind that they apply to an 
increase in distance of only one kilometer. The returns to the whole distance are of course 
greater. They are presented in Table (5) for three distances and four education levels. Other 
covariates are at the sample median. For a youth with the Bac, at the mobility threshold of 20 
km for example, migrating 20 km increases the salary by 1.3% in comparison to the salary of 
a youth who does not migrate. For a distance covered of 100 km, the salary increase is 3.2%. 
It is 6.2% for migration distance of 200 km. For a youth with the Bac+5 level, these increases 
are 1.8%, 8.9% and 17.5% respectively. 









































7A threshold effect manifestly exists. Let us consider a youth who moves by 120 km for 
example. At the threshold of 20 km, the total return from the kilometers covered (100 km 
beyond the limit) is 8.9% for a Bac+5 education level. At mobility threshold of 100 km, this 
return is only 1.5% for the 20 km distance covered beyond the threshold. Our results suggest 
that choosing a geographic area of great size may lead to an underestimation of returns to the 
total distance of the migration. 
Whatever the level of education, the total returns to distance covered appear positive and 
statistically significant. In other words, taking into account the distances leads us to nuance 
the results of Détang-Dessendre, Drapier and Jayet (2004) on French data, who concluded that 
positive returns to geographic mobility existed exclusively for the highest levels of education. 
7  Conclusion 
Taking into account distances covered and interactions between the level of education and the 
first geographical migration leads to several original conclusions.  
We have captured spatial mobility without a priori regarding geographical areas selected and 
used different kilometric thresholds to characterize this migration.  It appears that returns to 
spatial mobility depend on the threshold selected. The total returns are in general weaker at 
high thresholds.  
Also, taking into account the distance covered between the dwelling place at the end of 
studies and the site of the first employment widens the range of what returns to spatial 
mobility can be.  Most earlier research in fact makes use of a simple indicator to measure 
returns from migration. Our results suggest decreasing marginal returns to spatial mobility 
with distance covered that increases with the level of education. This result is not in 
contradiction with the theory of employment prospection, or with the hypothesis of a link 









































7Finally, we find positive marginal returns to spatial migration for at least one threshold and 
for several distances, whatever the level of education. 
Further investigations should evidently complement this study, focusing in particular on 
migrations during careers on the labor market. This study is limited to the first migration on 
departure from the educational system.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Live in Paris region  17.5% 
Live in Couple  26.2% 
Migrants 72.4% 
 P10  P25  P50  P75  P90 
Spatial Migration when >0 (in kms)  5  9  20  87  359 
Education Level  12  12  14  15  18 
Age 18  19  21  23  26 








Table 2: Reduced form equations - Validity of the instruments - 
     Threshold=0  Threshold=20  Threshold=50  Threshold=100 
H0: δ2i=0  Test p-value test p-value test p-value test p-value test p-value 
y1 3 8 7 7   0           
y2     3502 0 1175 0 1099 0 1106 0 
(y1y2)      4230 0 1423 0 1237 0 1210 0 
(y2)
2     5198 0 1798 0 1442 0 1257 0 
y3 7 3 8 4   0           
y4 299  0          
Notes: δ2i is the vector of parameters corresponding to the excluded instruments X2 in equation i, for i=2,3,4,5,6 
and 7.  LR tests are used for spatial migration and its related variables, the Paris region and participation. A score 











































 Table  3:  Log wage equation 
Threshold of mobility  0  20  50  100 
Intercept  5,808*** 5,837*** 5,827*** 5,826*** 
  (0,034) (0,034) (0,032) (0,031) 
y1 0,090*** 0,088*** 0,089*** 0,089*** 
  (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) 
y2 × 10
-2 -0,019 -0,038 -0,018 -0,007 
  (0,026) (0,027) (0,023) (0,025) 
(y1y2) × 10
-3 0,033** 0,051***  0,040***  0,043*** 
  (0,015) (0,017) (0,015) (0,016) 
(y2)
2 × 10
-5 -0,047* -0,053** -0,055* -0,085** 
  (0,026) (0,026) (0,029) (0,033) 
y3 0,070*** 0,071*** 0,073*** 0,073*** 
  (0,010) (0,009) (0,009) (0,009) 
Lives in a rural area at the end of schooling  -0,017*** -0,017*** -0,018*** -0,018*** 
  (0,005) (0,005) (0,005) (0,005) 
Place of studies, population density × 10
-3 0,005*** 0,006*** 0,005*** 0,005*** 
  (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) 
Mother is inactive or retired  0,013*** 0,013*** 0,013*** 0,013*** 
(0,004) (0,004) (0,004) (0,004) 
Father's profession: agriculture  -0,029*** -0,029*** -0,028*** -0,028*** 
(0,009) (0,009) (0,009) (0,009) 
Father's profession: technician  -0,024*** -0,023*** -0,023*** -0,023*** 
(0,006) (0,006) (0,006) (0,006) 
Father's profession: unknown  0,024*** 0,024***  0,024***  0,024*** 
(0,006) (0,006) (0,006) (0,006) 
Mother’s profession: agriculture  -0,018 -0,018 -0,018 -0,017 
(0,012) (0,012) (0,012) (0,012) 
Mother’s profession: clerk  -0,018*** -0,017*** -0,018*** -0,017*** 
  (0,004) (0,004) (0,004) (0,004) 
v ˆ 1 -0,018*** -0,016*** -0,016*** -0,016*** 
  (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) 
v ˆ 2×10
-3 -0,076 0,145 -0,064  -0,409 
  (0,267) (0,289) (0,257) (0,279) 
v ˆ 12×10
-3 0,005 -0,014 -0,002  -0,003 
  (0,015) (0,018) (0,017) (0,017) 
v ˆ 22×10
-3 0,176 0,215 0,205  0,720** 
  (0,267) (0,261) (0,298) (0,351) 
v ˆ 3 0,020*** 0,020*** 0,019*** 0,019*** 
  (0,007) (0,006) (0,006) (0,006) 
v ˆ 4 -0,307*** -0,314*** -0,317*** -0,317*** 
  (0,034) (0,034) (0,033) (0,033) 
Adjusted R
2 0.359 0.359 0.359 0.359 












































7Table 4: Marginal returns to spatial mobility 
Threshold of mobility   0  20 
Distance  20 100 200 400  20 100 200 400 
Marginal returns (%)                 
Without  qualification  0.013 0.005 -0.004 -0.023* 0.011 0.002 -0.008  -0.029** 
  (0.014) (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.013) (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.013) 
Bac 0.023*  0.015*  0.006  -0.013  0.026** 0.018**  0.007*  -0.014 
  (0.012) (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.011) (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.011) 
Bac+2 0.029***  0.022*** 0.012***  -0.007  0.036*** 0.028*** 0.017***  -0.004 
  (0.011) (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.010)  (0.010) (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.009) 
Bac+5 0.039***  0.032*** 0.022***  0.003  0.051*** 0.043*** 0.032***  0.011 
  (0.012) (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.012) (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.011) 
Threshold of mobility  50  100 
Distance  20 100 200 400  20 100 200 400 
Marginal returns (%)                 
Without qualification  0.019*  0.011  -0.000  -0.022  0.033**  0.019**  0.002  -0.032* 
  (0.012) (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.015)  (0.013) (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.017) 
Bac  0.032*** 0.023*** 0.012***  -0.010  0.045*** 0.032***  0.015***  -0.019 
  (0.011) (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.012)  (0.012) (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.014) 
Bac+2  0.039*** 0.031*** 0.019***  -0.003  0.054*** 0.040***  0.024***  -0.010 
  (0.011) (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.011)  (0.012) (0.007)  (0.002)  (0.013) 
Bac+5  0.052*** 0.043*** 0.032***  0.009  0.067*** 0.053***  0.036***  0.002 
   (0.013) (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.014) (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.013) 
Notes : Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses are computed with the Delta method. Significance levels of 10, 5 and 




 Table 5: Total returns to spatial mobility 
Threshold of mobility    0      20   
Distance  20 100  200 20  100  200 
Total  returns  (%)         
Without  qualification  0.647*** 1.553*** 2.886*** 0.995***  2.426***    4.635***   
  (0.003) (0.008) (0.016) (0.003)  (0.009) (0.017) 
Bac 0.848***  2.060*** 3.916***  1.302*** 3.206*** 6.235*** 
  (0.003) (0.008) (0.016) (0.003)  (0.009) (0.017) 
Bac+2 0.982***  2.399*** 4.608***  1.508*** 3.729*** 7.315*** 
  (0.003) (0.008) (0.016) (0.003)  (0.009) (0.017) 
Bac+5 1.183***  5.655*** 10.576*** 1.816*** 8.956*** 17.468*** 
  (0.003) (0.008) (0.016) (0.003)  (0.009) (0.017) 
Threshold of mobility    50      100   
Distance  20 100  200 20  100  200 
Total  returns  (%)         
Without  qualification  0.778*** 1.873*** 3.494*** 0.828*** 1.952*** 3.502*** 
  (0.003) (0.008) (0.015) (0.003)  (0.008) (0.016) 
Bac  1.0199*** 2.484*** 4.739*** 1.087*** 2.610*** 4.843*** 
  (0.003) (0.008) (0.015) (0.003)  (0.008) (0.016) 
Bac+2  1.181*** 2.894*** 5.578*** 1.261*** 3.051*** 5.747*** 
  (0.003) (0.008) (0.015) (0.003)  (0.008) (0.016) 
Bac+5  1.424*** 6.849*** 12.909*** 1.522*** 7.116***  12.811*** 
   (0.003) (0.008) (0.015) (0.003)  (0.008) (0.016) 
     Notes: other covariates are at the sample median. Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Significance  









































7Appendix A  
Table A1: Education level: reduced form equation  
Dependent variable  Education level  Education level 
Model   Poisson model  Negative binomial 
Intercept   2,763*** (0,004)  2,763***  (0,004) 
Region to be educated        
Paris Region  ref.   ref.   
Paris Basin  -0,001 (0,004)  -0,001  (0,004) 
North  0,030*** (0,004)  0,030***  (0,004) 
East  0,002 (0,004)  0,002  (0,004) 
West/10  0,005 (0,004)  0,005  (0,004) 
South West  0,019*** (0,004)  0,020***  (0,004) 
Middle East  -0,014*** (0,004) -0,014*** (0,004) 
Mediterranean  0,021*** (0,004)  0,021***  (0,004) 
Area at the end of schooling        
Lives in a rural area   -0,050*** (0,002) -0,049*** (0,002) 
Population density × 10
-3 0,006*** (0,0002) 0,006***  (0,006) 
Surface × 10
-3 0,010*** (0,001)  0,010***  (0,001) 
Parents' origin         
Father is French  Ref.   Ref.   
Father is French by acquisition  -0,021*** (0,006) -0,021*** (0,006) 
Father is not French  -0.033*** (0,006) -0,033*** (0,007) 
Mother is French  Ref.   Ref.   
Mother is French by acquisition  0,005 (0,006)  0,005  (0,006) 
Mother is not French  -0,021*** (0,007) -0,020*** (0,007) 
Parents' occupational status        
Father in private sector  Ref.   Ref.   
Father in public sector  -0,004* (0,002)  -0,005**  (0,002) 
Father is unemployed  -0,014** (0,005) -0,014**  (0,005) 
Father is retired  0,090*** (0,003)  0,090***  (0,003) 
Mother in private sector  Ref.   Ref.   
Mother in public sector  0,002 (0,002)  0,002  (0,002) 
Mother is unemployed  -0,024*** (0,005) -0,024*** (0,005) 
Mother is inactive or retired  -0,002 (0,002)  -0,003  (0,002) 
Father's profession        
farmer  -0,065*** (0,005) -0,066*** (0,005) 
corporate manager  -0,076*** (0,004) -0,077*** (0,004) 
professionals  Ref.   Ref.   
technicians and associate professionals  -0,054*** (0,004) -0,054*** (0,004) 
clerks  -0,096*** (0,003) -0,097*** (0,003) 
workers and elementary occupations  -0,123*** (0,003) -0,123*** (0,003) 
unknown  -0,083*** (0,004) -0,084*** (0,004) 
Mother's profession        
farmer  -0,068*** (0,007) -0,069*** (0,007) 
corporate manager  -0,061*** (0,005) -0,061*** (0,005) 
professionals  Ref.   Ref.   
technicians and associate professionals  -0,044*** (0,005) -0,045*** (0,005) 
clerks  -0,061*** (0,003) -0,062*** (0,003) 
workers and elementary occupations  -0,090*** (0,004) -0,090*** (0,004) 
unknown  -0,082*** (0,004) -0,083*** (0,004) 
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels of 10, 5 and 1% are denoted *, ** and 
*** respectively. The coefficients of the Hurdle model cannot be interpreted in terms of distance.  Only the 









































7Table A2: Spatial migration – Decision to move (probit): reduced form equation   
Threshold   0    20   50    100   
Intercept   1,191*** (0,042) -0,150***(0,039) -0,799***(0,043) -1,016***  (0,046) 
Region to be educated              
Paris Region  ref.   ref.   ref.   ref.   
Paris Basin  -0,433***(0,035) 0,121*** (0,033) 0,320*** (0,038) 0,298***  (0,041) 
North  -0,275***(0,042) 0,135*** (0,040) 0,348*** (0,045) 0,356***  (0,048) 
East  -0,391***(0,037) 0,045  (0,035) 0,242*** (0,040) 0,197***  (0,044) 
West/10  -0,446***(0,037) 0,142*** (0,035) 0,351*** (0,039) 0,327***  (0,042) 
South West  -0,492***(0,039) 0,112*** (0,037) 0,343*** (0,042) 0,340***  (0,045) 
Middle East  -0,355***(0,036) -0,023  (0,035) 0,220*** (0,039) 0,190***  (0,043) 
Mediterranean  -0,746***(0,035) 0,064*  (0,033) 0,276*** (0,038) 0,309***  (0,041) 
Area at the end of schooling              
Lives in a rural area   0,170*** (0,023) 0,193*** (0,022) 0,014  (0,024) 0,006  (0,026) 
Population density × 10
-3 -0,053***(0,002) -0,032***(0,003) -0,012***(0,003) -0,001  (0,003) 
Surface × 10
-3 -0,046***(0,008) 0,019**  (0,008) 0,069*** (0,008) 0,080***  (0,009) 
Parents' origin               
Father is French  Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   
Father is French by acquisition  -0,153***(0,052) -0,146***(0,053) -0,161***(0,059) -0,152**  (0,064) 
Father is not French  -0,182***(0,056) -0,130** (0,059) -0,202***(0,066) -0,183**  (0,072) 
Mother is French  Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   
Mother is French by acquisition  0,066 (0,051)  -0,010  (0,051)  0,015 (0,056)  0,017  (0,060) 
Mother is not French  -0,105*  (0,057)  -0,071 (0,060)  -0,035 (0,067)  -0,060  (0,073) 
Parents' occupational status              
Father in private sector  Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   
Father in public sector  -0,030  (0,021)  0,013 (0,021)  0,035 (0,022)  0,035  (0,024) 
Father is unemployed  -0,093** (0,047) -0,033  (0,048) -0,004 (0,053)  -0,014  (0,058) 
Father is retired  0,045 (0,029)  0,173*** (0,028)  0,202*** (0,030)  0,183***  (0,032) 
Mother in private sector  Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   
Mother in public sector  0,040* (0,022)  0,046**  (0,022)  0,066*** (0,023)  0,059**  (0,025) 
Mother is unemployed  -0,058 (0,051)  -0,056 (0,052)  -0,076 (0,058)  -0,116*  (0,064) 
Mother is inactive or retired  -0,022 (0,021)  -0,012 (0,021)  0,006  (0,023)  -0,012  (0,025) 
Father's profession              
farmer  -0,127** (0,052) -0,155***(0,050) -0,199***(0,054) -0,305***  (0,059) 
corporate manager  -0,192***(0,033) -0,216***(0,032) -0,197***(0,034) -0,241***  (0,036) 
professionals  Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   
technicians and associate prof.  0,045 (0,034)  -0,144***(0,032)  -0,200***(0,035) -0,251***  (0,037) 
clerks  -0,098***(0,026) -0,245***(0,025) -0,267***(0,027) -0,282***  (0,028) 
workers and elementary occup.  -0,076***(0,029) -0,328***(0,028) -0,342***(0,030) -0,370***  (0,032) 
unknown  -0,250***(0,034) -0,306***(0,033) -0,285***(0,036) -0,284***  (0,039) 
Mother's profession              
farmer  -0,067 (0,065)  -0,162***(0,063)  -0,216***(0,068) -0,180**  (0,074) 
corporate manager  -0,012 (0,050)  -0,133***(0,048)  -0,161***(0,052) -0,155***  (0,056) 
professionals  Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   
technicians and associate prof.  -0,039 (0,045)  -0,144***(0,043)  -0,124***(0,046) -0,126***  (0,049) 
clerks  -0,027 (0,030)  -0,148***(0,028)  -0,159***(0,030) -0,159***  (0,032) 
workers and elementary occup.  -0,010 (0,040)  -0,230***(0,038)  -0,298***(0,042) -0,306***  (0,045) 
unknown  -0,147***(0,036) -0,199***(0,035) -0,171***(0,037) -0,154***  (0,040) 










































7Table A3: Spatial migration – Distance when positive (2-part model): reduced form equation 
Threshold   0    20    50    100   
Intercept   -31203*** (2310)  -72477*** (5845)  -821***  (163) 59  (40) 
Region to be educated              
Paris Region  ref.  ref.  ref.    ref.   
Paris Basin  10970*** (1099) 6138***  (2259) -434*** (100)  -227*** (37) 
North  13492*** (1289) 21382*** (2078) 73  (102)  -17  (40) 
East  12134*** (1188) 17961*** (1854) 46  (95) 45  (37) 
West/10  15451*** (1316) 19873*** (1458) 21  (88) -8  (34) 
South West  16572*** (1387) 25410*** (1627) 206**  (91) 63*  (35) 
Middle East  11487*** (1137) 19792*** (1600) 11  (91) 10  (36) 
Mediterranean  20020*** (1548) 32529*** (1808) 518***  (93) 196***  (33) 
Area at the end of schooling              
Lives in a rural area   -481 (404)  -8429***  (1835)  15 (51)  20  (20) 
Population density × 10
-3 426*** (59) 1522***  (187)  24***  (7)  2  (2) 
Surface × 10
-3 1510*** (146) 3714*** (593) 25  (16)  -8  (6) 
Parents' origin               
Father is French  Ref.   Ref.   Ref.    Ref.   
Father is French by acquisition  -5711*** (1298)  -12463***  (4673) -316**  (152)  -143**  (59) 
Father is not French  -5175*** (1426)  -11577** (5010) -91  (163)  -49  (62) 
Mother is French  Ref.   Ref.   Ref.    Ref.   
Mother is French by acquisition  -1628 (1009)  21  (3745)  -87  (126)  -42  (50) 
Mother is not French  -744 (1358)  408  (4860)  -54  (162)  10  (61) 
Parents' occupational status              
Father in private sector  Ref.   Ref.   Ref.    Ref.   
Father in public sector  1153*** (364) 2940**  (1386)  55  (46)  25  (18) 
Father is unemployed  -96 (1017)  -939  (3781)  -65  (127)  -21  (49) 
Father is retired  3747*** (492) 5336*** (1780)  53  (60)  16  (23) 
Mother in private sector  Ref.   Ref.   Ref.    Ref.   
Mother in public sector  590 (371)  681 (1426)  -46  (49)  -19  (19) 
Mother is unemployed  -1389 (1086)  -2180 (4041)  6  (131)  51 (51) 
Mother is inactive or retired  166 (385)  577 (1472)  -13  (50)  17  (19) 
Father's profession              
farmer  -4524*** (968)  -11624***  (3924) -284**  (123)  -17  (46) 
corporate manager  -3368*** (577)  -5362**  (2169) -186***  (72) -33  (27) 
professionals  Ref.   Ref.   Ref.    Ref.   
technicians and associate prof.  -5538*** (678)  -10565***  (2473) -217***  (75) -35  (28) 
clerks  -5056*** (532)  -7270*** (1744) -137**  (54) -25  (21) 
workers and elementary occup.  -8566*** (788)  -10387***  (2240) -196***  (66) -16  (25) 
unknown  -3455*** (623)  -2352  (2193) -51  (74) 5  (29) 
Mother's profession              
farmer  -5298*** (1289)  -14298***  (5169) -258  (163)  -110* (62) 
corporate manager  -1815** (803)  -2345  (3075)  22  (103)  26  (41) 
professionals  Ref.   Ref.   Ref.    Ref.   
technicians and associate prof.  -2330*** (721)  -3810  (2771) -145  (95) -55  (37) 
clerks  -2586*** (445)  -3802**  (1688) -71  (57) -16  (22) 
workers and elementary occup.  -8257*** (975)  -13692***  (3307) -186*  (96) -45  (37) 
unknown  -1391** (556)  -564  (2150)  -6  (74)  -4  (29) 
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. The coefficients of the two-part cannot be interpreted in terms of 
distance. Only the signs count. The coefficients do not reflect marginal returns. Significance levels of 10, 5 and 1% are 











































7Table A4:  education level × distance and distance squared: reduced form equations 
(threshold 20 kms ) 
  y1 . y2   y1 . y2    y2²   y2²  
Model Probit  2-part  model  Probit  2-part model 
Intercept   -0,150***(0,039) -245357***(6933) -0,150*** (0,039) -24545***(2441)
Region to be educated               
Paris Region  ref.   ref.    ref.    ref.  
Paris Basin  0,121*** (0,033) -2173  (5783) 0,121***  (0,033) -2062**  (1046)
North  0,135*** (0,040) 58481***  (8099) 0,135***  (0,040) 8935***  (1310)
East  0,045 (0,035)  48230***  (6916) 0,045  (0,035)  7121***  (1183)
West/10  0,142*** (0,035) 57107***  (5283) 0,142***  (0,035) 6534***  (1105)
South West  0,112*** (0,037) 80806***  (5797) 0,112***  (0,037) 10017*** (1292)
Middle East  -0,023 (0,035)  55984***  (5881) -0,023  (0,035)  6502***  (1128)
Mediterranean  0,064* (0,033)  109653*** (4855) 0,064*  (0,033)  14407*** (1536)
Area at the end of schooling               
Lives in a rural area   0,193*** (0,022) -53693*** (7074) 0,193***  (0,022) -2861*** (592) 
Population density × 10
-3 -0,032***(0,003) 5833***  (593)  -0,032*** (0,003) 475***  (61) 
Surface × 10
-3 0,019** (0,008)  16317*** (1477) 0,019**  (0,008)  1133*** (166) 
Parents' origin                
Father is French  Ref.   Ref.    Ref.    Ref.  
Father is French by acquisition  -0,146***(0,053) -47571*** (1355) -0,146*** (0,053) -6973*** (1745)
Father is not French  -0,130** (0,059) -52552*** (6148) -0,130**  (0,059)  -4362*** (1657)
Mother is French  Ref.   Ref.    Ref.    Ref.  
Mother is French by acquisition  -0,010 (0,051)  -2622*  (1440) -0,010  (0,051)  -479  (1221)
Mother is not French  -0,071 (0,060)  -6552  (6367) -0,071  (0,060)  -72  (1553)
Parents' occupational status               
Father in private sector  Ref.   Ref.    Ref.    Ref.  
Father in public sector  0,013 (0,021)  10843**  (5042) 0,013  (0,021)  1299***  (435) 
Father is unemployed  -0,033  (0,048)  290  (771)  -0,033 (0,048)  -1217 (1249)
Father is retired  0,173*** (0,028) 34528***  (5993) 0,173***  (0,028) 1827***  (549) 
Mother in private sector  Ref.   Ref.    Ref.    Ref.  
Mother in public sector  0,046** (0,022)  2519  (5115) 0,046**  (0,022)  -26  (448) 
Mother is unemployed  -0,056 (0,052)  -15657***  (687)  -0,056  (0,052)  -775  (1299)
Mother is inactive or retired  -0,012 (0,021)  1980  (5450) -0,012  (0,021)  279  (456) 
Father's profession               
farmer  -0,155***(0,050) -50691*** (5640) -0,155*** (0,050) -4107*** (1279)
corporate manager  -0,216***(0,032) -31738*** (6723) -0,216*** (0,032) -1858*** (677) 
professionals  Ref.   Ref.    Ref.  (0,000)  Ref.  
technicians and associate prof.  -0,144***(0,032) -45259*** (7125) -0,144*** (0,032) -4022*** (796) 
clerks  -0,245***(0,025) -43473*** (5218) -0,245*** (0,025) -2587*** (535) 
workers and elementary occup.  -0,328***(0,028) -68856*** (6720) -0,328*** (0,028) -3305*** (695) 
unknown  -0,306***(0,033) -20543*** (7019) -0,306*** (0,033) -216  (656) 
Mother's profession               
farmer  -0,162***(0,063) -60060*** (3107) -0,162*** (0,063) -5601*** (1790)
corporate manager  -0,133***(0,048) -15576*  (8810) -0,133*** (0,048) -301  (931) 
professionals  Ref.   Ref.    Ref.    Ref.  
technicians and associate prof.  -0,144***(0,043) -15457*  (8632) -0,144*** (0,043) -2318**  (928) 
clerks  -0,148***(0,028) -21315*** (4463) -0,148*** (0,028) -1250**  (508) 
workers and elementary occup.  -0,230***(0,038) -75221*** (7083) -0,230*** (0,038) -5365*** (1114)
unknown  -0,199***(0,035) -12232**  (6109) -0,199*** (0,035) -197  (651) 
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. The coefficients of the two-part cannot be interpreted in terms of 
distance. Only the signs count. The coefficients do not reflect marginal returns. Significance levels of 10, 5 and 1% are 










































Table A5 : Paris region and sample selection: reduced form equations 
Dependent variable  Paris region  Sample selection 
Model   probit probit 
Intercept   1,199*** (0,051) 1,217***  (0,047) 
Region to be educated        
Paris Region  ref.   ref.   
Paris Basin  -1,966***(0,041) 0,105***  (0,040) 
North  -2,227***(0,052) -0,090*  (0,046) 
East  -2,489***(0,051) 0,292***  (0,044) 
West/10  -2,117***(0,046) 0,169***  (0,043) 
South West  -2,162***(0,050) -0,027  (0,045) 
Middle East  -2,389***(0,049) 0,167***  (0,042) 
Mediterranean  -2,321***(0,044) -0,133*** (0,039) 
Area at the end of schooling        
Lives in a rural area   -0,369***(0,041) 0,104***  (0,029) 
Population density × 10
-3 0,041*** (0,004) 0,004  (0,003) 
Surface × 10
-3 0,073*** (0,012) 0,017*  (0,009) 
Parents' origin         
Father is French  Ref.   Ref.   
Father is French by acquisition  0,033 (0,075)  -0,135**  (0,060) 
Father is not French  0,128 (0,080)  **  (0,066) 
Mother is French  Ref.   Ref.   
Mother is French by acquisition  0,169** (0,071)  0,017  (0,060) 
Mother is not French  0,151* (0,081)  -0,049  (0,067) 
Parents' occupational status        
Father in private sector  Ref.   Ref.   
Father in public sector  -0,047 (0,031)  -0,080***  (0,025) 
Father is unemployed  0,065 (0,067)  -0,158***  (0,053) 
Father is retired  0,147*** (0,040) -0,115*** (0,034) 
Mother in private sector  Ref.   Ref.   
Mother in public sector  0,037 (0,031)  -0,071***  (0,027) 
Mother is unemployed  -0,098 (0,081)  -0,155***  (0,060) 
Mother is inactive or retired  -0,057* (0,032)  -0,052** (0,026) 
Father's profession        
farmer  -0,337***(0,083) -0,039  (0,066) 
corporate manager  -0,315***(0,046) -0,065  (0,040) 
professionals  Ref.   Ref.   
technicians and associate professionals  -0,250***(0,046) 0,014  (0,042) 
clerks  -0,308***(0,035) -0,105*** (0,032) 
workers and elementary occupations  -0,411***(0,040) -0,087**  (0,035) 
unknown  -0,337***(0,048) -0,297*** (0,039) 
Mother's profession        
farmer  -0,188* (0,107)  0,184**  (0,086) 
corporate manager  -0,129* (0,071)  0,031  (0,060) 
professionals  Ref.   Ref.   
technicians and associate professionals  -0,025 (0,060)  0,037  (0,054) 
clerks  -0,122***(0,040) 0,075**  (0,035) 
workers and elementary occupations  -0,253***(0,058) 0,112**  (0,048) 
unknown  -0,109** (0,050) 0,002  (0,043) 
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. The coefficients of the two-part cannot be 
interpreted in terms of distance. Only the signs count. The coefficients do not reflect marginal 
returns. Significance levels of 10, 5 and 1% are denoted *, ** and *** respectively. 
  27
h
a
l
s
h
s
-
0
0
1
3
1
8
4
9
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
1
9
 
F
e
b
 
2
0
0
7